Research Paper – 2019
As unique and intriguing it could sound, some individuals have indicated having sexual intercourse with robots. In situations of sexual intercourse, the question of whether consent has been freely given could arise. Before being able to address such an issue, common ground has to be established about the robots involved, but also what their legal statutes are.
As a large variety of machines could be considered as robots, it is necessary to start with a broad definition, “A robot is a constructed system that displays both physical and mental agency but is not alive in the biological sense”. The society commonly sees a humanoid robot with the appearance of a human being, with Artificial Intelligence.
A robot as a possessor of Artificial Intelligence is said to have 5 attributes: the ability to communicate with others, internal knowledge, external or outside world knowledge, some degree of intentionality and some degree of creativity. The description highlights an idea of an autonomous machine. The Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Union offered what could be a common definition of smart autonomous robots in the EU in the future. Similar to the definition of a Robot possessing artificial intelligence, a smart autonomous robot “acquires autonomy through sensors and/or by exchanging data with its environment (inter-connectivity) and trades and analyses data, is self learning (optional criterion), has a physical support”.
As robots, whichever their shape, are machines their number increases in our societies, they came as helpers, companions of vulnerable persons or autonomous tools. Unfortunately, robots do as well cause considerable damages that could sometimes result in deaths. To mitigate and compensate the victims, it is necessary to secure the possibility to prosecute the responsible for the damage caused. To incur one’s liability, it is necessary to have some sort of personhood or legal personality for example for companies. One of the goal of personhood is to regulate human conduct by an organised society and allowing liability to be engaged, and allocating the cost of victims’ injuries. With the current state of legislation, liability can possibly not be engaged in some cases. The idea of granting personhood to robot has emerge, precisely creating an electronic personhood, but is utterly controversial.
After reviewing what are the common ground used in Robot liability, this essay will present the existing alternatives to the current liability regime and will discuss the possibility in granting robot with electronic personhood.
Current liability regime for accidents caused by a robot:
Robots could be asked to follow basic commands, but also obey primary principles such as to treat all human individuals in a humane way. In some way, animals and robots have similar uses; they are programmed by humans to pursue a purpose, such a guide dogs or rescue dogs, and to protect human life. Animals show social behaviours and relationships with their peers. If an animal causes damage, usually its owner is held liable. The same principle can be applied to robots.
Product liability is often used in cases involving robots used as commercial products. The main liability regime that exists nowadays is negligence, failures to warn, failures to take proper care. Negligence allows multiple parties to be liable with different degrees of liability and include the causal chain. In the manufacturing of a robot,several manufacturers are usually involved. If for example, a robot throwing a ball hit someone, who could be held responsible? It could be the programmer of the object recognition software, it could also be the manufacturer of the camera, and it also might be a battery deficiency or even wrong instructions given by the owner.
The problem comes with the failure to take proper care: what is foreseeable and reasonable? Robots can now learn new ways of interacting with people in a highly complex world. Robots cannot be held liable per se for acts or omissions that cause damage to third parties; as regards non-contractual liability, Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 19851 can only cover damage caused by a robot’s manufacturing defects and on condition that the injured person can prove the actual damage, the defect in the product and the causal relationship between damage and defect (strict liability or liability without fault). This legal framework does not cover a broad range of situations and is not adequate for the next generation of robots.
Alternatives to the current liability regime for robots
Punishment is generally conceived as corrective. The wrongdoer pays their debt to society, which could be with money or restrictions of freedom. We can’t apply the usual criminal punishment to the robot; however, there is criminal law for non-humans, called corporations. Corporations have some rights; they can own property, sign contracts, be held liable for negligence, and in some ways be also punished for criminal activities or causing environmental damage. However, they cannot be put in jail.
Corporations are entities created by humans and recognised by law as an artificial person having attributes of personhood conferred on it through incorporation by a state agency. Their legal statute was created mainly for the convenience of economic transactions and its relations with the rest of the world. In case of accidents, it is not necessary to identify the actual author of the crime; victims will be compensated by the company, which therefore multiple the chances of solvability. Although this regime could somehow be replicated for robots, this regime will not address the question of consent for sexual robots.
Electronic personhood as a rational legal response
Personhood have been granted to non-human individual for example the Whanganui River, Chimpanzee or idol in some religions.
People treat humanoids more like humans than machines. We could put more blame on the creator of a robot that doesn’t look like a human than in one anthropomorphizing. Humans tend to interact with robots in different ways if they look like them. Legal personhood includes rights and duties and is not equal to a natural person. The Juridical person who was granted legal personhood does not have to be a human being. Legal personhood exists to ease economic traffic and proceedings in courts. The physical form of a robot should not be taken into consideration in this debate. Nonetheless, the idea of consciousness and consent is part of the controversy. As it is impossible to confirm consciousness and awareness of a robot, offering a legal personhood similar to human being could not morally and ethically be granted to robots.
As mentioned earlier, the European Parliament has started to bring forward the idea of an electronic personhood for robots, which was severely discarded in an open letter from several AI experts. In April 2018, the EU Commission released a document on AI without mentioning the “electronic personhood.” Despite the reluctance to grant electronic personhood to robots, the reality will require some regulation, especially with the rise of sex robots and the possible advocacy for marriage between human beings and robots.
Resources
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